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HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S CnnitiNAL LIABILITY-CoERCION-HUSBAND'S PRESENCE. State v. Miller, 62 S. W. 692

Missouri, April 23, 1901. The case presents this state of facts:
the wife, defendant in the action, procured a revolver and conveyed it to her husband who was confined in prison convicted of
murder. She was indicted under a statute against conveying
instruments of escape into prisons. Convicted, she appealed on
the ground that she acted under the coercion of her husband and
must therefore be exonerated.
This discussion will include notice of the nature, history and
application of the doctrine under which this prisoner claimed the
right to acquittal.
In its nature the legal principle is as simple as a statement of
it, which may be made as follows: a wife acting in the presence
of her husband is presumed to act under his coercion and cannot
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be convicted of crime under such circumstances, unless the contrary be shown. The reason for the rule is found in the consistency of the law; for, having put upon the wife the duty of
submitting her will to that of her husband, it cannot consistently
do otherwise than presume the absence of criminal intent for her
when in the presence of her husband's will, onor justly accuse her
for fulfilling that legal duty.
In its history the doctrine is very ancient. Blackstone says
that it is found in the laws of Ina, the West Saxon, which takes
it back over 1,250 years. It has passed through several interesting phases in development. At first the presence of the husband
seems to have been an absolute defence for the wife in all crimes.
The first exceptions noted in the books are Somerville's case,
I And. 104 (circa 1584), and Somerset's case, Stat. Trials, V.
1, Tr. 28 and 29 (1615). In the former both Somerville and
his wife were attaint of treason, and in the latter the Earl and
his wife were held guilty as accessories to murder. Perhaps from
these cases treason and murder came to be considered exceptions
to the rule. At any rate they were so recognized in Hale's time,
1 H. P. 0. 45.
According to Lord Hale's. opinion another change had also
come into the doctrine. He considered that the presence of the
husband was only a rebuttable presumption of coercion, not an
absolute defence. 1 H. P. 0. 516.
Blackstone speaks of the exception of the greater crimes to
the general rule, but says nothing of its being considered other
than an absolute defence. And in 1823 we find authority for the
belief that it was then treated as an absolute defence. Rex v.
Knight, 1 C.& P. 116, note.
The tendency has been away from that, however, and now it is
the law generally that this presumption of coercion may be
rebutted. Reg. v. Torpey, 12 Cox 0. 0. 45, U. S. v. Terry, 42
Fed. Rep. 317.
It is in the application of the principle that the difficulty lies,
and it centres about the definition of the word "presence," for,
although the authorities agree that neither the fact nor the presumption of coercion can be established without proof of the
presence of the husband, some of them have strained the meaning of the word to the point where for all practical purposes it
includes "absencep." In general, however, it seems to be sufficient
for the husband to be near enough to the wife at the time of the
act for her to be under his immediate control or influence. Conolly's case, 2 Lewin C.C. 229, State v. Fertig, 98 Ia. 139; Com.
v. Flaherty, 140 Mfass. 454.
The present case exceeds all others observed in thus stretching
the doctrine. The decision followed the case cited in the note to
Rex v. Knight (supra), and the similarity of the fact seems to
have outweighed a difference in the law. There the statute, 16

NOTES.

Geo. II, C. 31, made it a crime to convey an implement of escape
into the jail and deliver it to the prisoner, but the Missouri statute, Rev. Stats. Mo. 1899, sec. 2061, makes it a crime to convey
such an implement into the jail. In the former case the crime
was completed in the presence of the husband and the
decision may well stand, but in this case the criminal act was
completed the instant the accused crossed the threshold of the
prison with the instrument in her possession, when the husband,
a convicted murderer in his cell, could not have been near enough
to her to exert any control over her.
On this basis, it is submitted that the jury was right in its
conclusion finding the wife to have acted independently of the
husband, and that the case was therefore ill-considered.
T. M. P.
WITNESS-CoMNPETENc.-Dicecerson v. Payne, 48 Atl. 528.
In this case, A. brought an action against B., administrator of
C., deceased, to recover for services rendered to the intestate
by the plaintiff as housekeeper and nurse. At the trial below the
plaintiff, against the defendant's objection, had been allowed to
testify that she rendered various services to the intestate personally because of his invalid condition. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that this testimony was "in the main, illegal,"
and made the rule to show cause why a new trial should not be
granted absolute.
The decision rests entirely upon the construction of the Act
of February 25, 1880, of New Jersey (2 Gen. St., p. 1407), the
section in controversy being as follows:
"That in all civil actions in any court of law or equity of this
State, any party thereto may be sworn and examined as a witness,
notwithstanding any party thereto may sue or be sued in a
representative capacity; provided, nevertheless, that this supplement shall not extend so as to permit testimony to be given as to
any transaction with or statement by any testator or intestate
represented in said action."
In construing this act the court in the case under discussion
adopted the opinion of Mir. Justice Reed in Smith v. Burnet, 35
N. J. Eq. 314-322, in which he says, "It is apparent that the
object of the Legislature is to be primarily regarded, and that
that object is to close the mouth of a party whose interest is
antagonistic to the estate of the deceased person in regard to those
transactions and conversations in which the deceased bore a part,
and concerning which he, if living, would be the most important
-perhaps the only witness besides the opposing party." This gives
us the spirit of the act, but in order to apply the principle here
laid down it is necessary to determine the meaning of the phrase,
"those transactions . . . in which the deceased bore a part."
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In other words, the problem which presents itself is this: What
must be the nature of the part taken by the deceased in the
transaction in order to render the evidence of it inadmissable?
An examination of the cases will show that the courts of New
Jersey have held that acts done on behalf of the testator or intestate, but not in his preence, are not transactions with the deceased
within the meaning of the act. Thus in Provost v. Robinson,
58 N. J. Law, 222, a suit was brought against the executor of the
deceased by the plaintiff upon a contract entered into by the testator for the erection of certain buildings; and it was held that
the plaintiff was competent to prove this work and expenditures
in pursuance of the authority thus given.
Beasley, 0. J. (in speaking of the act of 1880), said, "In its
connection with the present case the inquiry arises with respect
to the scope of the meaning of the phrase, 'any transaction with
the testator,' etc. Manifestly the work and expenditures in question were transactions for the testator, but in what way were they
transactions with him? He was not present when such acts were
performed, nor did he by deed, word or presence, participate in
their doing. Such matters the deceased was interested in, but
they plainly were not transactions with him. The statute qualifies the party to be a witness in some respects in these cases, but
if he is to be excluded from testifying with respect to the subjects
here in question, it is difficult to see how his testimony could be
in any case available; it would seem that he could testify only to
transactions irrelevant to the issues. The statutory expression is
indistinct, and must, therefore, be interpreted so as to effectuate
the legislative purpose as indicated in the context, and that purpose was to incapacitate the living witness with respect to personal intercourse and conversation with the deceased." See also
Woolverton v. Van Syckel, 57 N. J. Law, 395.
These cases although no direct authority for the proposition
that the mere presence of the testator or intestate at the time
of the doing of the act would be such a "participation" in it as
to make evidence of it inadmissable, still they intimate that such
would be the policy of the law. The decision in the present case
is undoubtedly a close one, and it apparently would have been
no strained construction to have said that these were "transactions for" the intestate but not "with him" so as to bring the
case within the prohibition of the act.
D. H. Y.

